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THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF EDUCATION EXPENSES: 
OCCUPATIONAL HAZARD? 
by 
Kathleen M. Weiden* and Helen F. Tomasko** 
INTRODUCTION 
In his book, The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith 
identifies four canons of taxation, by which to evaluate a tax 
system. 1 These canons are: equality, convenience, economy 
and certainty. Equality means that a taxpayer is treated fairly 
and equitably by the payment of taxes in proportion to his or 
her income level. Convenience represents simplicity in 
administration ofthe tax system, which impacts compliance. 
Economy refers to the collection of tax revenue in the most 
cost efficient manner possible. Certainty means the ability of 
taxpayers to predict the effect of the tax structure on their 
affairs. 
Beyond paying taxes in proportion to one's income, 
equality should also imply that taxpayers in similar situations 
should receive the same treatment under the tax laws. This 
paper addresses the issue of equality in practice by examining 
the record of judicial and administrative decisions, with respect 
to the deductibility of education expenses under § 162 of the 
Internal Revenue Code ("I.R.C."), across various occupations. 
• Assistant Professor of Taxation at Fairfield University. B.S. from Manhattan College, a 
M.S., Taxation from Pace University and a Ph.D. from Baruch College of the City University 
of New York. Dr. Wciden is also a CPA (New York). 
**Candidate for a MBA with Taxation Concentration at Fairfield University. B.S. in 
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This examination is motivated by the United State Tax 
Court ("Tax Court") analysis and holding in an August, 2004 
case, Will M McEuen IlL et ux. v. Commissioner 2 on the 
deductibility of education expenses under I.R.C. § 162. In 
disallowing the taxpayer's expenditures for a Masters of 
Business Administration degree ("MBA"), the court concluded 
that the taxpayer's educational expenditures were incurred to 
meet the minimum educational requirements for the position of 
an associate in an investment banking firm, and therefore, were 
investments in personal capital, and were non-deductible. In 
reaching this conclusion, the court held that the three year 
position of analyst (the position from which one could be 
promoted to associate) was a "subordinate temporary position" , 
and therefore analysts were not yet engaged in the trade or 
business of investment banking, despite being employed by an 
investment banking firm. In addition, the court held that the 
change in the taxpayer's potential scope of duties, as a result of 
additional education, qualified her for a new trade or business, 
which also made the education costs nondeductible. 
The Tax Court's conclusion that the position of analyst 
was a "subordinate temporary position" to the "permanent 
career position" of associate raises the following questions. 
Across occupations, when are more specialized and/or 
responsible positions considered a different trade or business 
than positions less specialized and/or responsible? Is there a 
basis for taxpayers to argue that the holdings and/or decisions 
in this area have resulted in less than equitable treatment across 
the various occupations under the tax law? 
This paper examines the record of judicial and 
administrative decisions on the deductibility of education 
expenses under § 162, for tax years after 1967, when the 
regulations for I.R.C. § 162 were last amended. The paper 
considers only decisions where the taxpayer is employed in a 
trade or business, in a general sense, prior to incurring 
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education costs. Decisions involving a taxpayer obtaining a 
bachelor's degree, the teaching profession or foreign nationals 
are not considered. 
This paper first discusses I.R.C. § 162 and the relevant 
regulations. Prior judicial and administrative decisions across 
a variety of occupations are then summarized, followed by an 
analysis of the decisions as they have been applied across 
occupations. The conclusion discusses the implications of, and 
questions raised by, this study. It appears that more questions 
are raised than answered. 
AUTHORITY FOR THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF 
EDUCATION EXPENSES 
The authority for the deduction of education expenses 
is established in I.R.C. § 162(a), which allows for the deduction 
of"ordinary and necessary trade or business expenses paid or 
incurred during the tax year in carrying on ·a trade or business." 
Although I.R.C. § 162(a) provides several examples of 
expenses that qualifY for deductibility, it does not provide an 
exhaustive list of qualifying expenses. The Regulations under 
I.R.C. § 162 are more specific, however, and address a variety 
of expenses, including travel, repairs and rentals. Reg. § 1.162-
5 addresses expenses for education. 
For purposes of this article, the first three paragraphs of 
Reg. § 1.162-5 are relevant. Reg. § 1.162-5(a) identifies the 
general types of educational expenditures that are deductible, 
Reg. § 1.162-5(b) identifies the general types of educational 
expenditures that are not deductible, and Reg. § 1.162-5( c) 
elaborates on the characteristics of deductible educational 
expenditures. 
Reg. §1.162-5(a) indicates that expenditures made by 
an individual for education are deductible, as ordinary and 
necessary business expenses," ... if the education (1) 
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maintains or improves skills required by the individual in his 
employment or other trade or business, or (2) meets the express 
requirements of the individual's employer, or the requirements 
of applicable law or regulations, imposed as a condition to the 
retention by the individual of an established employment 
relationship, status, or rate of compensation." Under Reg. 
§ 1.162-5( c )(I), refresher courses, courses dealing with current 
developments, and academic and/or vocational courses are 
deemed to be education that maintains or improve skills 
required in an individual's employment or other trade or 
business. Under Reg. § 1.162-5( c )(2), education meets the 
express requirements of the individual's employer or the 
applicable law or regulation, imposed as a condition of 
employment retention, status or rate of compensation, when 
there is a bona fide business purpose for the employer to 
impose such requirements. 
Reg. §1.162-5(b)(1) indicates that when educational 
expenditures constitute an investment in the taxpayer's 
personal capital, such expenditures are not deductible. Under 
Reg. § 1.162-5(b )(2)(i), a taxpayer's expenditures, for an 
education that meets the minimum educational requirements 
for qualification in his/her employment or other trade or 
business, are investments in the taxpayer's personal capital, 
and are therefore, nondeductible. The employer's 
requirements, applicable law and regulations, as well as 
standards of the profession, trade or business involved are all 
factors in determining the minimum education required to 
qualify for a position or other trade or business. In addition, 
the fact that a taxpayer is rendering services in a particular 
employment status suggests that the taxpayer has already met 
the minimum education requirements. Under Reg. § 1.162-
5(b)(3), educational expenditures that qualify the taxpayer for a 
new trade or business are also considered investments in the 
taxpayer's personal capital, and are therefore, nondeductible. 
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This regulation further indicates that a change of duties will not 
constitute a new trade or business if the new duties involve the 
same general type of work performed in the taxpayer's current 
position. 
As a final consideration, both Reg. §§1.162-5(c) and 
1.162-5(b )(1) contain the same caveat. If the education fulfills 
the minimum employment requirements for the taxpayer or 
qualifies the taxpayer for a new trade or business, such 
expenditures will be treated as investments in personal capital, 
and therefore, nondeductible. Thus, in order to successfully 
deduct educational expenditures under I.R.C. § 162, taxpayers 
must not only demonstrate that the educational expenditures 
meet the definition of deductible educational expenditures; 
they must also show that those same expenditures do not 
constitute investments in personal capital. 
DETERMINATION OF THE TRADE OR BUSINESS 
BOUNDARIES OF CERTAIN OCCUPATIONS 
Almost without exception, the decisions in this area 
begin with the question of whether the occupation-related 
education costs meet the standards for non-deductibility under 
Reg. § 1.162-5(b ), rather than whether they meet the standards 
for deductibility under Reg.§ 1.162-5(a). A determination that 
educational expenses are non-deductible renders moot the 
question of whether the education expenses are deductible. 
The majority of the decisions have focused on the standards for 
non-deductibility provided in Reg. §1.162-5(b)(3), rather than 
those provided in 
Reg. §1.162-5(b)(2). 
Reg. § 1.162-5(b )(3) indicates that a change in duties 
resulting from further education will not constitute a new trade 
or business if the new duties reflect similar responsibilities 
prior to the education. The courts and the IRS use a 
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commonsense approach to determine whether the taxpayer has 
entered a new trade or business. 3 Typically, this means that a 
comparison is made ofthe taxpayer's duties before the 
education versus the taxpayer's duties after the education so as 
to establish lines of demarcation between trades or businesses. 
In making this comparison, the courts and/or the IRS have 
often relied upon the duties described and permitted under state 
licensure law and/or professional certification standards for the 
particular occupation ("external determinants of duties"). In 
those occupations without applicable state licensure law or 
professional certification standards, the courts and/or the IRS 
have relied upon the taxpayer's or the employer's own 
delineation or description of duties for the particular 
occupation ("internal determinants of duties"). 
External Determinants of Duties 
Occupations with Licensure: 
Despite the fact that the taxpayer was already engaged, 
either completely or to a large extent, in a particular field, the 
courts generally conclude that moving from unlicensed status 
to licensed status in the same field is moving from an existing 
trade or business to a new trade or business for purposes of 
Reg. §1.162-5(b)(3). This reflects the perception that an 
unlicensed taxpayer cannot be performing the same general 
duties as a licensed taxpayer, despite being in the same field. 
Thus, unlicensed accountants have been denied 
deductions for courses required to qualify as a Certified Public 
Accountant 4 ("CPA") and for review courses to prepare for the 
CPA exam5. A landscape architect was denied a deduction for 
education to qualify him to sit for the Registered Landscape 
Architect exam in Massachusetts6. A law librarian was denied 
7 . 8 the costs of law school , as were patent exammers. 
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The courts have also generally viewed a taxpayer 
moving from one license to another as moving from an existing 
trade or business to a new trade or business. These decisions 
reflect the notion that changing licenses means changing fields, 
and it is not reasonable to assert that the general duties can be 
the same for purposes ofReg. §1.162-5(b)(3) when two 
different fields are involved. 
A CPA engaged in taxation and business planning was 
denied deductions for costs of)aw school9, a licensed practical 
nurse was denied deductions for costs of education to become a 
physician's assistant10, an attorney was denied deductions for 
education costs to become a real estate broker11 , and a nurse 
was denied deductions for costs of a degree program in 
biology, a prerequisite for entrance into medical school. 12 
One decision involves two licenses in the same field. In 
Charles A. Robinson 13, the taxpayer, a licensed practical nurse 
("LPN"), deducted the costs incurred in pursuing a program 
that would entitle her to sit for the registered nurse ("RN") 
examination in Minnesota. The taxpayer argued that the 
education maintained or improved her skills in the trade or 
business of nursing. The court first reviewed the Minnesota 
nursing statutes, which licenses both practical nursing and 
registered nursing. The court concluded that the state's 
separate licensing of practical and registered nursing was 
evidence that Minnesota" ... envisions a very definite 
qualitative difference between a RN and a LPN." The court 
indicated that while the statute identifies some duties as being 
identical, RNs possessed certain additional powers that LPNs 
did not, such as delegating nursing functions to other nursing 
personnel. It should be noted that the court also reviewed the 
job descriptions of the positions of LPN and RN at the hospital 
where the taxpayer worked part-time during her education, and 
concluded that the hospital-employer also viewed an LPN and 
a RN as two different trades or businesses. This decision 
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reflects the notion that the two licenses in the same field must 
be two different trades or business because the state regulations 
specify two distinct sets of duties. 
Occupations with Licensure and Professional Certification: 
In Rev. Rul. 74-78 14, the IRS ruled that a dentist 
engaged in the full time practice of general dentistry, who 
returned to dental school on a full-time basis to study 
orthodontics, was entitled to deduct his costs of the 
orthodontics education. The taxpayer continued his general 
dentistry practice on a part-time basis during the time he was in 
dental school, and after the postgraduate education, limited his 
practice to orthodontics. The IRS concluded that the costs 
incurred for the studies in orthodontics were incurred to 
maintain or improve the taxpayer's skills as a dentist, and did 
not qualify him to enter a new trade or business. In reaching 
this conclusion, the IRS cited Example ( 4) of Reg. § 1.162-
S(b )(3)(ii), which indicates that the costs of a program of study 
and training for psychoanalysis by a practicing psychiatrist are 
deductible, as the program maintains or improves skills 
required in the taxpayer's trade or business. Thus, in Rev. Rul. 
74-78, the IRS did not deem the practice of general dentistry as 
a different trade or business than the practice of orthodonture. 
In Iglesias v. Commissioner15, the taxpayer, a licensed 
general physician and second year resident in psychiatry, 
underwent psychoanalysis. As part of the residency, the 
taxpayer worked a forty-hour week, one third of which was 
spent in classes and two thirds of which was spent in various 
patient care activities in the hospital. In addition, the taxpayer 
was on call at the hospital for twelve hours per week. The 
psychoanalysis was not a requirement of the psychiatry 
residency, nor a requirement to become a board-certified 
psychiatrist. The Commissioner argued against deductibility of 
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the psychoanalysis costs on the grounds that the medical 
specialty of psychiatry is a different trade or business than the 
trade or business of general medicine. The court declined to 
rule on this point. Although the court noted that Example (4) 
of Reg. § 1.162-5(b )(3)(ii) addressed a practicing psychiatrist, 
the court concluded that the taxpayer's services rendered as a 
psychiatry resident meant he was already engaged in the trade 
or business of "a licensed physician treating psychiatric 
patients". Since the taxpayer was already engaged as "a 
licensed physician treating psychiatric patients", the 
psychoanalysis maintained or improved his skills , and 
therefore, the costs associated with the psychoanalysis were 
deductible. 
Occupations with Professional Certification: 
In Ted Radin16, the taxpayer, an actuarial analyst, 
endeavored to pass the Society of Actuaries exam. Passing the 
initial seven parts of the exam offered by the Society conveys 
the title of "Enrolled Actuary" ("EA''), and completion of all 
ten parts ofthe exam conveys the title of"Fellow of the 
Society of Actuaries" ("FSA"). In the year under issue (1983), 
and even now, actuaries are not licensed by the states. The 
taxpayer deducted the costs of actuarial books and materials as 
well as actuarial examination fees, on the grounds that these 
expenses were incurred to maintain his present position and 
salary. The court pointed out that an EA can prepare and 
submit certain pension plan documents to the Internal Revenue 
Service, and that a FSA has additional rights and privileges 
beyond those of an EA. Based on these factors, the court 
determined that, under professional standards, the services the 
taxpayer could provide as an actuarial analyst were different 
than those he could render as an EA or a FSA. Since the 
professional standards envisioned different services, the duties 
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of an actuarial analyst and an EA or a FSA cannot be the same, 
and education costs to become an enrolled actuary or a FSA are 
therefore not deductible. 
Internal Determinants of Duties 
Occupations without Licensure or Professional Certification: 
In Albert C. Ruehmann III17, the Commissioner argued 
against deductibility of the taxpayer's graduate tax studies on 
the basis that the taxpayer had not yet established himself in a 
trade or business. The court, however, determined that the 
taxpayer's four months of practice as an attorney, after 
graduation from law school but prior to entrance into the 
master's of tax law program, were sufficient to demonstrate 
that the taxpayer had established himself in the trade or 
business of practicing law. Since the court found that the 
taxpayer had indeed been engaged in a trade or business at the 
time the education costs were incurred, the next issue was 
whether the education qualified the taxpayer for a new trade or 
business. The court was not required to determine whether the 
practice of general law and the practice of tax law were two 
different trades or businesses, because the Commissioner had 
conceded this issue in a reply brief submitted earlier to the 
court. By arguing that the education costs should be denied 
because the taxpayer had never engaged in a trade or business 
(in the Commissioner's opinion, four months was an 
insufficient time for a taxpayer to establish a trade or business), 
the Commissioner indicated the regulations would permit the 
taxpayer's deduction of the costs of obtaining his LL.M. degree 
if the taxpayer was already engaged in the practice of law prior 
to the education. The IRS apparently made no distinction 
between the practice of general law and the practice of tax law. 
Since the court found that the taxpayer had engaged in the 
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trade or business of law before entering the graduate tax 
studies program, the court had no option but to hold that the 
education expenses were deductible. 
In Stephen G. Sherman 18, in July 1969, the taxpayer 
secured a two year managerial-administrative position with the 
Army and Air Force Exchange Service ("AAFES") VietNam 
Regional Exchange. The taxpayer's responsibilities included 
formulating and monitoring management, contingency and 
emergency plans, including the phase-down of exchanges in 
conjunction with troop redeployment; personnel management; 
and the review and evaluation of major policy and procedures 
with respect to inventory control, procurement and distribution. 
Additionally, he represented the VietNam region in 
discussions regarding planning operations with the Department 
of Defense, the Department of State and legislative officials. 
In early May 1971, the taxpayer was accepted into the MBA 
program at Harvard University, and requested a leave of 
absence from the AAFES. The request was denied on the 
grounds that his two-year employment term with the AAFES 
would expire on July 25, 1971, leaving the taxpayer free to 
pursue graduate studies. While denying the leave of absence, 
the AAFES encouraged the taxpayer to apply for employment 
upon completion of his graduate studies. After the taxpayer's 
employment contract with the AAFES terminated in July 1971 , 
the taxpayer entered the MBA program, presumably in 
September 1971, and graduated in June 1973. During the two 
years the taxpayer was a full time student in the MBA 
program, he was not under an employment contract with the 
AAFES or any other employer. In late 1972, while still at 
Harvard, the taxpayer applied for re-employment at AAFES, 
but was denied due to reduced staff needs. Upon graduation 
from Harvard in August 1973, taxpayer became Director of 
Planning and Research at Radix Corporation. The taxpayer 
deducted the costs of his MBA education at Harvard 
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University. The court concluded that the taxpayer's trade or 
business was business administration and that he had been 
engaged in the trade or business of business administration 
both before (with the AAFES) and after (with Radix 
Corporation) the education. Since the taxpayer was engaged in 
the same trade or business both before and after the education, 
the time during which the taxpayer was unemployed and 
completing his education was treated as time spent in the 
taxpayer' s trade or business, under the hiatus principle. Since 
the Commissioner only argued that the taxpayer had not 
established himself in a trade or business before the education, 
that the taxpayer was not carrying on a trade or business while 
in graduate school and that the taxpayer's suspension from his 
trade or business was not temporary or definite, the court 
assumed that the education costs otherwise met the standards 
of deductibility stipulated in Reg. § 1.162-5 and allowed those 
costs as a deduction. 
In FrankS. Blair19, the taxpayer was hired by Sherwin 
Williams Co. as a personnel representative after earning her 
undergraduate degree on a full time basis. Prior to attending 
college, the taxpayer had been a homemaker for fourteen years, 
but worked part-time and accumulated the equivalent of five 
and one-half years ofbookkeeping and payroll accounting 
experience. As a personnel representative, the taxpayer made 
hiring recommendations, suggested personnel policy changes, 
established salaries for various jobs within the firm and 
assisted employees with health and other employee benefits. 
In January 1975, the taxpayer entered a two-year part-time 
evening MBA program, while continuing to work full time for 
Sherwin Williams. When the taxpayer was promoted to 
personnel manager in December 1975, her duties became 
primarily supervisory. She received a substantial increase in 
pay and became responsible for hiring decisions and for the 
department budget. The taxpayer received her MBA in 
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December 1976. The Commissioner argued that the positions 
of personnel representative and personnel manager were two 
different trades or business, and that the MBA qualified the 
taxpayer for the position of personnel manager. Although the 
court noted that a personnel representative could only make 
recommendations while a personnel manager could make 
decisions, the court also recognized that there was substantial 
overlap in the taxpayer's responsibilities as personnel 
representative and personnel manager. The court concluded 
that neither the acquisition of a new title or the difference with 
respect to making recommendations versus making decisions 
were sufficient to constitute different duties for purposes of 
Reg. §1.162-5(b)(3), and held the educational expenditures 
deductible. 
In Robert C. Beatt/0, the taxpayer joined McDonnell 
Douglas in January 1972, after receiving bachelor's and 
master's degrees in aeronautical engineering. The taxpayer's 
title was "Engineer/Scientist Specialist" and his initial 
responsibilities primarily involved the design and testing of 
technology used to guide, navigate and control aircraft flight. 
The taxpayer's career objective was to move into engineering 
operations management, by becoming involved in software 
integration, which involved the management of the technical 
aspects of guidance system development, coordination of the 
integration of the guidance system into the flight computer 
program, and development of software for testing and 
evaluation. These activities required him to coordinate the 
work of numerous other engineers within the firm across area 
specialties, and to interact with related professionals inside and 
outside the firm, as well as resolve conflicts between 
individuals, groups and subcontractors. The taxpayer 
matriculated in a Master's of Science in Administration 
program, which was oriented towards management 
administration. In holding the costs of the education 
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deductible, the court concluded that the education maintained 
or improved the taxpayer's skills in his trade or business, 
despite the fact that the bulk of the taxpayer's duties revolved 
around engineering responsibilities. The court could not " ... 
perceive any discrete line of demarcation between the 
engineering aspect of his employment and the administrative 
role he played in the software integration area; ... " The court 
concluded that the education did not qualify the taxpayer for a 
new trade or business, because " . . . the studies merely 
reflected a change in his duties at McDonnell." That is, the 
change in the taxpayer's duties after the education was not 
sufficiently different than his duties before the education to be 
treated as a new trade or business for purposes of Reg. § 1.162-
5(b)(3). 
In Daniel D. Granger21 , the taxpayer was employed as a 
Fifth Key Carrier by a supermarket chain, checking-out 
customers, maintaining shelves and ordering inventory. The 
Fifth Key Carrier position, on the lower management level of a 
retail food establishment, is lower in supervisory and 
managerial authority and responsibility than Fourth, Third, 
Second and First Key Carrier, where the store manager is First 
Key Carrier. The taxpayer worked the night shift at the 
supermarket. Since no store manager (First Key Carrier) or 
anyone with more supervisory authority was on duty at night, 
the taxpayer served as the manager on the night shift. Upon his 
own initiative, the taxpayer attended a food marketing 
management program, earning a certificate upon completion. 
The employer did not require the education, but after obtaining 
the certificate, the taxpayer was subsequently promoted 
through the ranks to First Key Carrier. The court upheld the 
taxpayer's deduction for the costs of the education, finding that 
the education" ... bore a substantial and direct relationship to 
the skills he needed in his ascension in the field of retail food 
management." The court concluded that, for purposes of Reg. 
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§ 1.162-5(b )(3), the duties of all ranks of Key Carriers were 
substantially the same. Interestingly, the court also found that 
the education did not qualify the taxpayer for a new trade or 
business because the taxpayer, despite holding the title of Fifth 
Key Carrier, functioned as a First Key Carrier when he worked 
the night shift. 
In Owen Gilliam III22 , the taxpayer, a level T-5 
employee at Honeywell, deducted costs of college level 
courses in business and computer programming. Although not 
required, the taxpayer was motivated to take the courses after 
his supervisor informed him that taking the college level 
courses would improve his chances for promotion. The 
taxpayer's principal duties were to program and repair 
computers. A promotion to T -6 or C-6 status would still 
require him to perform that work, but also allow him to become 
involved in management decisions, such as handling reports, 
scheduling and planning complex programs. The court 
concluded that the college level courses maintained and 
improved the taxpayer's skills as a computer programmer, and 
also found the taxpayer's testimony credible that a promotion 
to grade 6 would involve basically the same skills and 
requirements of a grade 5, but with greater responsibilities. 
In Private Letter Ruling 9112003, the taxpayer, a 
practicing attorney for four years, intended to resign from his 
position as associate attorney and return to school to obtain a 
master's degree in tax law. During the course of his 
employment with two law firms over the four-year period, the 
taxpayer did minimal tax-related legal work. The master's in 
tax law was expected to take nine months on a full time basis 
to complete, after which, the taxpayer intended to return to the 
practice of law. The Commissioner cited Ruehmann to 
conclude that the master's of tax law merely improves the 
taxpayer's skills in his existing trade or business, rather than 
qualifies him for a new one. Again, the IRS made no 
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distinction between the practice of general law and the practice 
of tax law. 
In Will M McEuen III, et ux. v. Commissione?3, the 
taxpayer received an undergraduate degree in economics and 
mathematics in 1992, and began working for Merrill Lynch 
("Merrill") later that year. The taxpayer's position there was 
that of financial analyst. In the financial analyst program, one 
could remain for a maximum of three years but an MBA was 
required to advance to the position of associate. At the end of 
that time with Merrill, the taxpayer had not yet acquired an 
MBA, so she left Merrill and accepted an analyst position with 
Raymond James Financial, Inc. ("James"). The analyst 
program there was of two to three year duration and again, an 
MBA was required to become an associate. The record 
indicates that analysts and associates were not always assigned 
to all of the same securities work. At times, analysts worked 
directly with a vice president or a managing director, without 
an associate. The record also indicates that the duties of 
analyst and associate were, in fact, similar. The court noted 
that in the investment banking industry at that time (1995 and 
1996), an MBA degree was required for the associate position. 
While at James, the taxpayer resigned her position to enroll in 
a graduate business program. Upon graduation from the 
graduate business program, the taxpayer was accepted into the 
"General Management Program" of a home furnishings 
manufacturer and became an "associate brand manager". 
In claiming deductibility of her educational 
expenditures, the taxpayer argued that she was in the 
investment banking business and the expenses were incurred to 
maintain or improve her skills in the trade or business of 
investment banking. Alternatively, she argued that the 
expenditures were required to maintain her existing 
employment relationship, status or rate of compensation. 
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McEuen represents somewhat of a departure from the 
other cases reviewed in this paper, in that the court addressed 
the standards for non-deductibility in both Reg. § 1.162-5(b )(2) 
and§ 1.162-5(b )(3). In holding for the Commissioner, the 
court classified the analyst position as a "subordinate 
temporary position", while classifying the associate position as 
a "permanent career position", from which one could advance 
further through the firm. The court cited corporate literature in 
which James identified itself as consisting of "twenty-three 
investment bankers and eight financial analysts." The court 
inferred from this that James itself did not view analysts as 
investment bankers. Based on the classification of the analyst 
position as temporary and James' description of the 
professional staff, the court concluded that although the 
taxpayer was performing investment banking services, she had 
not yet met the minimum educational qualification as an 
investment banker, and the expenditures for the MBA were 
incurred to meet those requirements. 
In addition, the court noted that even if the analyst and 
associate positions were not two different trades or businesses, 
under Reg. § 1.162-5(b )(3), the deduction for the education 
costs would be denied on the basis that the MBA would enable 
the taxpayer to perform significantly different duties and 
activities after the education. The change in the taxpayer's 
potential scope of duties provided by the education was 
sufficient to constitute a new trade or business. 
EQUITABLE TREATMENT? 
To reach a conclusion on whether the decisions in this 
area result in equitable treatment for the various occupations 
under the tax law, three questions must be answered: 
(1) Do the decisions based on external determinants of 
duties result in equitable treatment for various 
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occupations, when considering only decisions based 
on external determinants of duties? 
(2) Do the decisions based on internal determinants of 
duties result in equitable treatment for various 
occupations, when considering only decisions based 
on internal determinants of duties? 
(3) Do the decisions result in equitable treatment across 
occupations when considering decisions based on 
both external and internal determinants of duties? 
First, do decisions based on external determinants of 
duties result in equitable treatment across various occupations, 
when considering only decisions based on external 
determinants of duties? For the most part, taxpayers appear to 
be equitably treated in decisions involving external 
determinants of duties, but an argument could be made that that 
dentists and doctors have received preferential treatment 
relative to other occupations in terms of the tax deductibility of 
their occupation-related education costs. 
Under Rev. Rul. 74-78, once a taxpayer qualifies and 
practices as a general practice dentist, the costs of an education 
to obtain a specialty beyond general dentistry are deductible, as 
they are deemed to maintain or improve the taxpayer's trade or 
business as a dentist. In other words, under Rev. Rul 74-78, 
for purposes of Reg. § 1.162-5(b )(3), the duties of a general 
practice dentist are the same as the duties of an orthodontist. 
Rev. Rul. 74-78 does not address the role of dental board 
certification of orthodonture, nor state licensure of dental 
specialties. 
The American Dental Association recognizes and 
regulates nine dental board specialties, and stipulates the 
advanced education and experience requirements.24 Example 
(3) of Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3)(ii) indicates that a two-week course 
reviewing new developments in several medical specialty 
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fields are deductible by a general practitioner of medicine, 
since the course maintains or improves skills required in the 
taxpayer's trade or business. Reg. §1.162-5(c)(1) indicates that 
refresher courses or courses dealing with current developments 
are deductible, as long as they are not the minimum 
requirements to enter the trade or business or to qualify the 
taxpayer for a new trade or business. Taxpayers generally 
view Example (3) of Reg. § 1.162-5(b )(3)(ii) and Reg. § 1.162-
5( c)( 1) as the authority for the deductibility of continuing 
professional education courses [e.g., continuing professional 
education ("CPE"), continuing medical education ("CME"), 
continuing legal education ("CLE"), etc.]. While continuing 
education is typically taken by professionals to maintain their 
license or professional certification, dental or medical specialty 
education is typically undertaken to obtain a new license or 
professional certification. It is clear that significant education 
and experience is required to obtain a dental board 
certification. Given the significant education and experience 
requirements for dental board specialty certification, it does not 
seem equitable to argue that the education required for board 
certification for dentists is the equivalent of the two-week 
continuing education course for other occupations 
contemplated by Reg. Sec. 1.162-5(b )(3). 
The more expansive view of duties for dentists 
established by Rev. Rul. 74-78 (particularly when the revenue 
ruling notes that the general practice dentist confined her 
practice to orthodontics after the education) is to be contrasted 
with the narrow view of duties in decisions involving 
accountants and landscape architects. The trade or business of 
an unlicensed accountant is considered different from a CPA, 
because an unlicensed accountant can serve only a portion of 
clients requiring accounting and tax services.25 The trade of 
business of an unregistered landscape architect is considered a 
different from a registered landscape architect, because an 
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unregistered landscape architect can service only a portion of 
clients requiring landscape architecture services. 26 Dental 
patients typically visit their general practice dentist annually or 
semi-annually, but seek out dental specialists only when the 
need arises. For example, dental patients typically seek the 
services of an orthodontist only once. If differences in the 
types of clients a taxpayer can serve before the education 
versus after the education is indicative of a change in duties for 
unlicensed accountants and unregistered landscape architects, 
is it equitable to maintain that a general practice dentist is 
serving the same patients as an orthodontist?27 
If external determinants of duties are relied upon to 
decide whether the taxpayer's duties before and after the 
education involve the same general type ofwork, are there 
differences in the weight placed on the external determinants of 
duties applicable to the particular occupation? What is the role 
of state licensure and professional certification in deciding if 
the taxpayer's duties before and after the education are of the 
same general type? Some occupations have licensure only, 
while others have licensure and professional certification, and 
still others have the latter only. 
Orthodontists and general practice dentists are in the 
same field (dentistry) and RNs and LPNs are in the same field 
(nursing). Orthodontists require additional education beyond 
that to become a general practice dentist. RNs require 
additional education beyond that of a LPN. Professional 
recognition for general practice dentists is conferred by state 
license, and for orthodontists, by dental board specialty 
certification. Professional recognition for both LPNs and RNs 
is conferred by state license. Yet, under Rev. Rul 74-78, the 
duties of an orthodontist (board certification) are the same as 
the duties of a general practice dentist (license), while, 
pursuant to Robinson, the duties of a LPN (license) are not the 
same as the duties of a RN (license). If nurses cannot deduct 
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the education costs to move from a LPN to a RN license, is it 
equitable to allow dentists to deduct the costs of moving from a 
DDSIDMD license to a board specialty certification? 
In Iglesias, the Commissioner argued that the trade or 
business of psychiatry is different from that of general 
medicine, and therefore, the taxpayer's costs ofpsychoanalytic 
training should not be deductible. Interestingly, this argument 
is the opposite of the Commissioner's earlier argument in Rev. 
Rul. 74-78, that a specialty field is the same trade or business 
as a general field. The Iglesias court declined to decide 
whether the trade or business of psychiatry is different from 
general medicine. Although the court noted that board 
certification did not require the doctor to undergo 
psychoanalysis, and that it was not part of the hospital program 
in which the taxpayer was a resident, the court did not address 
whether completion of the residency in psychiatry was required 
before the physician (i.e., a medical doctor or "M.D.") could 
hold himself out as a board certified psychiatrist and seek 
employment as such. 
The Occupational Outlook Handbook of the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor indicates that 
M.D.s seeking board certification in a specialty must complete 
a residence in the specialty and pass a final examination for 
certification by the American Board of Medical Specialists. A 
resident is always under the supervision of, and is responsible 
to, a supervising physician educator of the same specialty in 
the hospital. The latter must certify that the resident has 
satisfactorily completed the residency program as part of the 
board certification process. 
Although the taxpayer in Iglesias was a licensed general 
physician by the second year of his residency, it was unclear 
whether he practiced as a general physician before beginning 
his psychiatry residency. This is an interesting omission 
because the simple holding of a license does not necessarily 
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mean that the taxpayer practices in that occupation. The 
deductions permitted under I.R.C. § 162 are allowed only when 
they incurred in conjunction with the carrying on of a trade or 
business. The Iglesias court found that the taxpayer's 
psychiatric patient services during the residency period were 
sufficient to consider the taxpayer already engaged in the trade 
or business of "a licensed physician treating psychiatric 
patients". In other words, the court preferred to characterize 
Iglesias' services required as part of his residency as the 
equivalent of carrying on a trade or business, rather than as the 
practical experience prerequisite to enter it. While the taxpayer 
of Rev. Rul. 74-78 had practiced general dentistry before 
commencing the orthodonture education, it appears that 
taxpayer in Iglesias did not practice general medicine before 
his psychiatry residency program. If he had, the court would 
have been able to rely upon Rev. Rul. 74-78, and would not 
have needed to characterize the practical experience 
component of the residency program as the carrying on of a 
trade or business. If Iglesias was already engaged in the trade 
or business of a licensed physician treating psychiatric patients, 
and therefore his costs of psychoanalysis were deductible, then, 
following Rev. Rul. 74-78, would not the education costs of his 
psychiatric residency, if any, also be deductible? This point 
was never brought up by the court or the taxpayer. 
Taxpayers in occupations other than medicine have 
generally not been permitted to treat the practical experience 
prerequisite for licensure or professional certification as the 
equivalent of carrying on a trade or business. Consider the 
following: (1) a medical resident must have completed 
medical school in order to enter a specialty residency program, 
and an unlicensed accountant must have completed, generally, 
an undergraduate degree in accounting to obtain a position in a 
public accounting firm; (2) a resident must accumulate the 
required number of specialty hours (both in the classroom and 
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the hospital) of the residency program, and an unlicensed 
accountant must accumulate, generally, twenty-four months of 
attestation practical experience; (3) the resident must complete 
the residency under the supervision of physician-educators, and 
an unlicensed accountant must complete the practical 
experience requirement under the supervision of CPAs; ( 4) the 
resident must pass an examination at the end of the residency 
to become board certified, and an unlicensed accountant must 
pass an examination to become state certified; (5) both the 
resident and the unlicensed accountant are paid for the services 
they render. Despite these similarities, Iglesias indicates that a 
psychiatric resident is already considered engaged in the trade 
or business of a licensed physician treating psychiatric patients, 
while Cooper and other earlier decisions indicate that an 
unlicensed accountant is not considered already engaged in the 
trade or business of public accounting, while performing the 
services of a licensed accountant under the supervision of a 
CPA. Given that public accounting work experience prior to 
licensure is not considered the carrying on of the trade or 
business of a CPA, is it equitable to treat the practical 
experience acquired during a medical specialty residency as the 
carrying on of a trade or business, particularly when the 
taxpayer has not carried on any trade or business before the 
residency? 
Second, do decisions based on internal determinants of 
duties result in equitable treatment across various occupations, 
when considering only decisions based on internal 
determinants of duties? While, for the most part, taxpayers in 
decisions involving internal determinants of duties appear to be 
equitably treated across occupations, this review suggests, 
however, that an argument could be made that certain 
occupations have received preferential treatment relative to 
other occupations in terms of the tax deductibility of their 
occupation-related education costs. 
49 I Vol. 16 I North East Journal of Legal Studies 
What constitutes a "sufficient" amount of time for a 
taxpayer to become established in a trade or business seems to 
depend upon the taxpayer's occupation. Although neither 
I.R. C. § 162 nor the regulations there under identify the amount 
of time spent in a particular employee or self employed 
position as a determinant of whether a taxpayer has established 
himself in a trade or business, the courts and the IRS do 
consider this factor. In Ruehmann, the court concluded that the 
taxpayer's four months of practice as an attorney during the 
summer between graduation from law school and entrance into 
a graduate tax program, were sufficient to show that the 
taxpayer had established himself in a trade or business prior to 
incurring the education costs in question. In contrast, in 
McEuen, the court concluded that, because the taxpayer's two 
employers had "up or out" policies (i.e., the employee must 
complete a MBA within three years of hire, or leave), the 
taxpayer's approximately five years of experience as an analyst 
could not be counted as time spent in the trade or business of 
investment banking before incurring the costs of an education 
required for promotion. If the four months between graduation 
from law school and graduate tax law school is a sufficient 
amount of time to establish the taxpayer in a trade or business, 
is it equitable to say that an analyst's five years of experience 
with two investment banking firms had not established her in a 
trade or business? 
Although neither I.R. C. § 162 nor the related regulations 
specify how to handle employment arrangements with fixed 
terms, the issue of fixed employment terms also seems to 
depend upon the taxpayer's occupation. In Sherman, the Tax 
Court concluded that the taxpayer's two year fixed term of 
employment with the AAFES was sufficient to show that the 
taxpayer had established himself in the trade or business of 
business administration, even though the taxpayer was 
unemployed from the expiration of his employment contract 
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until he commenced graduate business school. The taxpayer 
took a position in private industry upon graduation, but 
whether the taxpayer's new position as Director of Planning 
and Research required a MBA or not was never addressed. In 
contrast, in McEuen, the court concluded that, because the 
taxpayer's term of employment at each of two employer firms 
was limited to three years unless the taxpayer earned a MBA 
degree, the taxpayer's combined five years of experience as an 
analyst did not establish her in the trade or business of 
investment banking before incurring the education costs. If a 
two-year term employment with the AAFES is sufficient to 
establish the taxpayer in the trade or business or business 
administration, is it equitable to say that five years as an 
analyst with two investment banking firms was a temporary 
position? 
Third, do decisions result in equitable treatment across 
occupations when considering decisions based on both external 
and internal determinants of duties? In Iglesias and McEuen, 
both taxpayers had positions with three year "up or out" terms. 
McEuen's position as analyst required her to successfully 
complete a MBA program by the end of the three-year term in 
order to continue and be promoted to associate. Iglesias' 
position as psychiatric resident required him to successfully 
complete the residency program by the end of the three year 
term, the total years of residency required for board 
certification as a psychiatrist.28 Residents who fail to complete 
either the prerequisite training or the exams cannot become 
board certified. Both taxpayers sought positions that require a 
combination of practical and educational experiences. The 
position of associate implicitly requires acceptable 
performance in the practical on-the-job training at the firm, and 
explicitly requires educational training. The position of board 
certified psychiatrist implicitly requires acceptable 
performance in the practical on-the-job training at the hospital, 
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and explicitly requires educational training. Both taxpayers 
were compensated for the time spent in acquiring the necessary 
prerequisite practical experience. 
The McEuen court, however, relying upon Reg. 
§ 1.162-5(b )(2), held that, although McEuen was performing 
investment banking services, she had not yet met the minimum 
education requirements for qualification in that trade or 
business. In contrast, the Iglesias court held that the taxpayer's 
time spent working in the hospital as a psychiatric resident was 
time spent in the trade or business of a "licensed physician 
treating psychiatric patients". The Iglesias court made no 
mention of Reg. § 1.162-5(b )(2) and seemed to ignore the fact 
that, although the taxpayer was rendering psychiatric services 
to patients, he had not yet met the minimum requirements to 
qualify as a board certified psychiatrist. 
CONCLUSION 
Employment-related education costs can be significant 
for many taxpayers, and deductibility of those costs can ease 
the financial burden. Taxpayers must be able to demonstrate 
that those educational costs not only meet the standards for 
deductibility, but also do not run afoul of the standards for non-
deductibility. However, in relying upon the record ofiRS and 
court decisions, taxpayers may find that the record contains 
inconsistencies and inequities. 
This paper has reviewed the record of IRS and court 
decisions with respect to the deductibility of employment-
related education costs under I.R.C. § 162. In making a 
comparison of the taxpayer' s duties before and after the 
education (as a means of determining whether the taxpayer has 
remained in the same trade or business or has qualified to enter 
a new trade or business), the courts rely, when possible, upon 
external determinants of the taxpayer's duties, such as state 
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licensure and/or professional certifications, or upon internal 
determinants of the taxpayer's duties, such as the taxpayer's or 
employer's own delineation or description of duties. The 
analysis of the treatment accorded taxpayers across various 
occupations suggests that taxpayers in certain occupations have 
received preferential treatment with respect to the deductibility 
of their education costs relative to taxpayers in other 
occupations. 
A number of questions remain. What is the role of 
external determinants of duties when more than one applies to 
a particular occupation? This is an important issue for 
occupations such as dentist and doctors, which involve a state 
license and either board certification or a second license. What 
is, or should be, the weight accorded each of the external 
determinants? What happens when a state institutes licensing 
of a dental or medical specialty that previously was only board 
certified? Does it alter the deductibility of education related 
costs? What about situations where the character of the 
practice before the education differs from the character of the 
practice after the education? Is the practice of general dentistry 
the same as a practice focused exclusively on orthodontics (i.e., 
Rev. Rul. 74-78)? Is the practice of general law the same as a 
practice focused exclusively on tax law (i.e. PLR 9112003)? Is 
obtaining orthodontic training the same thing as undergoing 
psychoanalysis? Example ( 4) of Reg. § 1.162-5(b )(3)(ii) 
indicates that the costs of a program of study and training for 
psychoanalysis by a practicing psychiatrist are deductible, as 
the program maintains or improves skills required in the 
taxpayer's trade or business. Rev. Rul. 74-78 and Iglesias, 
among other decisions, cite Example (4) of Reg. Sec. 1.162-
5(b)(3)(ii) in concluding that the taxpayer's education costs 
were deductible as they are deemed to be incurred to maintain 
or improve the taxpayer's trade or business skills. 
Psychoanalysis is a therapy employed by psychiatrists, 
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psychologists and social workers as part of psychological 
counseling to identify the unconscious factors that affect 
behavior and emotions. Conversely, state law prohibits anyone 
who is not part of the field of dentistry from practicing 
orthodonture 
The regulations under Sec. 162 were last amended in 
1967, when the United States economy was more an industrial 
economy than the service economy it is today. It is likely since 
1967, the increased role of services-type occupations in the 
economy has been accompanied by a growth in the number of 
members of professional organizations and boards, as well as a 
significant increase in the number of occupations, specialties 
and sub-specialties licensed by states and/or certified by 
professional organizations or boards. It may be time for 
Congress to review Section 162 as it applies to employment-
related education costs. 
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